With U S Armed Forces begmnmg then-mnth consecutive year of force structure drawdown, and the thu-d anmversary of the BUR approachm,, 0 are U S forces able to support the two-MIX requirement 7 First, there IS growing concern over the "amount" of U S rmhtary forces available to declslvely fight and wm t\\o MRCs Crltlcs argue that a gap exists between the planned BUR force structure and budget reality A second closely related concern goes to the shape of U S rmhtary forces -the relevance and agility of major force structure elements to counter those "equally dangerous, ambiguous threats" referenced by General Shahkashvrh With approxlTately two-thxds of the current DOD budget and Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP) allocatec/ for manpower, operations and upkeep of the exlstma force structure, sufliclent dollars are not programmed for force reshaping modermzatlon programs
With the above concerns as lead-ins, four issues central to U S military strategy versus the size and shape of U S mlhtary forces ~111 be evammed m this paper First, the kahdlty of the How does the U S achieve needed force modermzatron m a resource-constrained world
Given that Korea appears to be the most stressing scenarro, an alternative strategy could be to carefully focus (1) preserving sufficient present dav force structure to decrsrvely counter the Korean threat, (2) mamtammg a residual conventronal deterrence capabrhty (an-power/prectsron strike bemg the best candidates) against a second potential aggressor and (3) use monres normally programmed to support the "excess" force structure to fund an aggressive force modermzatron plan To support thrs alternative strategy a ' one MRC plus" force of 7-8 an-craft carriers, 6-7 Owens' "systems of systems" represents another, reusable force multlpher Owens has stated that lmprovmg battlefield Yidehty" 1s not really a budgetary issue as most of the systems are already fielded The real issue 1s tymg (integrating) single-service designed systems together "
The above paragraphs briefly touch on some selected ways to re-shape our forces Of greater importance 1s the approach employed to systematically take down force structure to pay for these programs The hlstoncal DOD "fax share" approach -nearly equal resource apportionment for each service -~~111 not work Instead, a two-pronged approach whxh frontloads procurement of lo\\-nsk technology systems that provide the best warfightmg pay-off, coupled with a thorough re-e\ aluatlon of the current doctrinal approach to Jomt warfighting 1s Three major constltuencles, Congress, Industry and L' S cltlzens, must to considered as a pohcq shtft of ths magnitude 1s formulated and Implemented First, all attempts must be made to hate the majonty of Congress "buy in* to this process, emphaazmg that the process has two major elements --a strategic shift and a force structure transformation As expected, some members will be reluctant to take down the force on the prormse that It ~111 reappear m a different form Alternatlkely, other members ~111 view the process as an opportumty to sh& more DOD dollars into domestic programs A close partnershp with the second pohtlcal constituency --Industry --prokldes a mechanism to work congressional issues Without question, C S mdustnes Again, a window of opportunity does exist as there 1s currently no other world power which possesses a comparable level of nuhtary power However, It IS unreasonable to expect that this sltuatlon 1~11 be the norm for the long term As Important, the present force structure 1s msufliclent to meet the stated requirement. and needed modermzatlon Dromams are bema delaved mto order to "sustam" the force Finally, the U S exerts slgmficant world influence and leadership through the routme employment of rmhtary forces Mamtammg the vlablhty, "threat relevance" and agility of this force over the long term, requrres mnovatlve solutions and the acceptance of some degree of risk to a&eve the kmd of force structure desired m the titure
